Caste and credit:  A woeful tale? by Kumar, Sunil Mitra & Venkatachalam, Ragupathy
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Caste and credit:  A woeful tale?  
      
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines caste-based differences in farmers’ access to bank loans in 
rural India. We investigate whether banks practice taste-based discrimination on 
the basis of caste. In order to identify potential discrimination, we consider loan 
applications and approval decisions separately. We find significant inter-caste differ- 
ences in application rates, and evidence of discrimination against Scheduled Tribe 
borrowers at the approval stage. To rule out the role of statistical discrimination, 
we simulate unobserved credit histories with various distributions. Evidence for 
taste-based discrimination persists despite accounting for unobservables. However, 
we find that this discrimination does not affect small farmers. 
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1 Introduction 
Access to resources and opportunities can be a critical factor in improving outcomes for 
disadvantaged groups. Barriers to accessing social, political and economic opportunities 
may not automatically reduce over time, and intervention through legislation and public 
policy, for instance through affirmative action, are often necessary. In particular, 
improving access to financial resources is widely acknowledged to facilitate upward 
economic and social mobility.1 Conversely, lack of access to resources for certain groups 
based on race, gender or ethno-social identities can perpetuate inequalities. 
In India, caste as a form of social identity remains an enduring predictor of economic 
status. It is correlated with occupation and employment (Prakash, 2015; Ito, 2009; 
Thorat and Attewell, 2007), income and expenditure (Deshpande, 2000), and capital 
more generally (Kijima, 2006). Agriculture is the largest employer in India, and due 
to the gap between sowing and harvest, bank credit is usually needed to be able to 
purchase various inputs (Conning and Udry, 2007). One important avenue through 
which caste can influence income and productivity in the rural sector, where 
agriculture dominates, is by shaping access to bank credit.  The question of whether 
caste influences access to credit is thus important, and while there is a general 
agreement that it does (Burgess et al., 2005; Kumar, 2013; Pal, 2002; Government of 
India, 2007), the reasons for these differences are less clear. One particular concern is 
whether lenders discriminate on the basis of caste (Kumar, 2013; Dréze et al., 1997).2  
In this paper, we focus on the role of caste in shaping access to financial capital, in 
particular bank loans, in rural India. Is there differential access for different caste-
groups, and if so, why? While varying levels of access might signal the presence of 
discrimination, 
they may also arise from the failure to seek resources and capitalise on opportunities. To 
make sense of potential caste-based discrimination in accessing credit, it is useful to note 
the parallels with discrimination in labor markets (Thorat and Attewell, 2007; Altonji 
and Blank, 1999) and the role of racial and gender-based discrimination in accessing bank 
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credit in the USA (e.g. Blanchflower et al., 2003; Blanchard et al., 2008; Asiedu et al., 
2010). Castes in India can be categorised into four major groups, viz. Scheduled Castes 
(SCs; the most disadvantaged), Other Backward Classes (OBCs; of middling 
disadvantage), Brahmins, who are traditionally cons ide red  to  be  privileged higher 
castes, and Scheduled Tribes (STs; also very disadvantaged).3,4,5  
There are at least two ways to explain discrimination within a rational choice framework. 
First, the taste-based discrimination proposed by Gary Becker (1971). According this 
definition, discrimination occurs if the differences in some outcome (loan approvals, 
wages) based on race, caste, or a similar attribute, are not ‘objective’. That is, if residual 
differences remain even after taking into account all possible borrower or worker 
characteristics that are relevant to the outcome, and are attributed to a ‘taste’ for 
discrimination on the part of the bank or employer. Second, discrimination may occur 
due to information problems relating to unobservable ‘objective’ characteristics – 
creditworthiness, ability – leading bank managers or employers to focus on other 
observable but correlated proxies such as race to extract the expected value of the 
relevant characteristic. This is referred to as statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973, 
1998). There is yet another way in which outcomes might differ systematically by caste 
or gender or race: if demand for pay, loans, or jobs varies based on group-belonging (e.g. 
Chevalier, 2007).6 In this paper we attempt to distinguish between these three 
phenomena. 
Though these notions of discrimination are intuitively straightforward to comprehend, 
the task of measurement is quite challenging. Empirical studies, for instance on 
mortgage lending in the USA, often use survey data to isolate the residual effects of race 
or gender. This approach suffers from the well known limitation that potential 
unobservables might lead to biased estimates given that such data are observational.7 
There is a small but growing literature that uses randomisation to study 
discrimination in labour markets (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Banerjee et al., 
2009). However, it is difficult to study loan approvals by banks using randomisation 
given the practical informational requirements of applying for loans. Moreover, some 
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aspects of access to credit are not readily amenable to study through randomisation. For 
instance, while randomized control trials (RCTs) have been utilized to study the effects 
of differential treatments extended by loan officers to borrowers based on their caste, 
their efficacy is limited for studying the question we are analysing since caste cannot be 
randomly allocated. Hence, RCTs cannot be used as a tool to study the effect of caste on 
loan applications since the initiative to apply comes from the individual. In view of these 
limitations, the literature on discrimination in labour and credit markets has mainly 
used observational data, as does our paper. Yet because potential unobservables remain a 
concern, we employ counterfactual simulations to investigate how our results might 
change if we could control for certain key unobservables. We adapt an approach 
suggested by Ichino et al. (2008) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to simulate a 
binary ‘credit history’ variable, and study how the residual effect of caste-group 
belonging on loan approvals changes with different distributional assumptions.8  
The paper asks the following questions: (a) How does caste influence farmers’ access to 
bank loans? (b) Do banks discriminate on the basis of caste? By way of addressing these 
questions, the paper also, albeit indirectly, addresses a larger question concerning the 
effectiveness of affirmative action policies in the financial sector. While caste-based 
affirmative action in government jobs and admissions to educational institutions 
(Bertrand et al., 2010) are more prominent, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has long 
directed bank lending towards disadvantaged groups (Reserve Bank of India, 2014, 2004, 
2008; Sriram, 2007). These policies are especially significant for bank lending in rural 
India, where expanding formal credit is thought to be key to increasing rural incomes.9  
We use nationally-representative data from the 2011-12 round of the India Human 
Development Survey (Desai and Vanneman, 2015), which enables us to study the 
decision to apply for a loan separately from the subsequent approval of this application. 
We focus on farmer households in rural India and their borrowings from banks. Our 
main findings are as follows. First, caste-wise differences do exist in access to loans and 
a major part of these differences can be explained by corresponding differences in 
application rates. SCs and STs, the two most disadvantaged groups, are 16-20% less 
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likely to apply for loans than are Brahmins and OBCs. Second, for those farmers who 
applied for bank loans, approval rates are almost uniform across Brahmins, OBCs, and 
SCs.  ST borrowers are 5-7% less likely to have a loan approved. In other words, STs 
likely face taste-based discrimination. Third, we argue that this finding is largely 
robust through a sensitivity analysis that constructs counterfactual scenarios 
concerning a key unobservable, viz. credit histories. Fourth, we find positive 
supportive evidence regarding the success of the RBI’s affirmative action initiatives for 
lending to small farmers. Dividing the sample according to land ownership, we find that 
caste-based differences in loan application and approval rates are largely muted for 
small farmers. Fifth, we find that the taste-based discrimination against STs is visible 
mainly in states with substantial ST populations, and not where they are a small 
minority. 
Our study has certain key advantages over previous work in this area. Researchers so far 
have studied the determinants of access to credit including caste (Kumar, 2013; Pal, 
2002) and whether farmers are credit-constrained (Kochar, 1997). These studies control 
for credit-worthiness characteristics including land-ownership, household demographics, 
and indicators of economic status, but do not control for the decision to seek credit. To 
our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to study rural bank lending in India using 
data that include information about loan applications. This enables us to explicitly 
distinguish between lender-based differences in loan approval rates and borrower-based 
differences in the demand for credit. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data, while 
section 3 lays out our empirical approach. Results are presented in section 4, and section 
5 discusses their implications. 
 
 
 
2 Data 
 
We use data from the second round of the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), a 
nationally-representative household survey undertaken in 2011-12 (Desai and Vanneman, 
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2015). These data provide information on a rich set of social, economic and demographic 
characteristics which are well suited to analysing the determinants of households’ borrow-
ing. Crucially, in this second survey round, households were asked whether they 
had applied for loans from various sources, and the success of those applications. 
This question is critical to exploring whether any caste-wise differences in loan 
patterns do indeed reflect discrimination on the part of lenders, and to our knowledge, 
no other large-scale household survey in India has asked this question.10 As per the 
questionnaire, data on bank loan applications and approvals refer to those during the 
five years preceding the survey. 
We focus only on formal sector, i.e. bank loans in the current paper. Such loans are 
widely considered superior than what the informal sector provides, owing to the usurious 
lending practices in the latter. Therefore, the question of caste-based differences is 
importance for the formal sector. It is also usually assumed that given a choice, farmers 
would opt for formal sector loans (e.g. Kochar, 1997). Therefore, excluding informal 
sector borrowings is also unlikely to compromise the identification of caste-based 
differences in application and approval rates for formal sector loans. 
The second round of the IHDS data consist of individual and household-level 
information, but village-level information have currently been released only for the first 
round of the survey that took place in 2004-05. In particular, the presence of a bank in 
the village or distance to the nearest such is potentially an important covariate that helps 
control for loan supply. But, since the data on village covariates are from the earlier 
survey round, we present results with and without including them and do not find these 
to be significantly different. 
We focus on farmer households in the rural sector, which we define as those households 
who report a) their main occupation as cultivation, and b) that they cultivate land. 
We focus on the 18 largest states (out of 28), and exclude Jammu and Kashmir, the 
North-Eastern states, Union Territories, Delhi and Goa, since these account for very few 
loans.11 Table 1 presents means and proportions for all variables by caste-group, and  
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Table 1: Means and proportions by caste-group 
     
     
N=8,543 Brahmin OBC SC ST 
Loans 
Proportion currently have loan 
 
 
0.422 
 
 
0.406 
 
 
0.285 
 
 
0.206 
Proportion applied for loan 0.445 0.428 0.306 0.243 
Proportion loan approved if applied (N=3,619) 0.947 0.947 0.930 0.849 
 
Land and income 
Land owned (acres) 
 
 
15.635 
 
 
12.097 
 
 
7.138 
 
 
10.129 
Land rented in (acres) 2.106 2.567 2.280 1.568 
Land rented out (acres) 2.003 1.515 1.261 1.182 
Monthly consumption expenditure (Rs ‘000) 133.255 109.646 85.422 62.919 
Annual income (Rs ‘000) 133.087 90.237 66.278 51.817 
 
Education and household composition 
Age of household head 
 
 
53.787 
 
 
52.076 
 
 
51.103 
 
 
49.249 
Proportion with male household head 0.946 0.944 0.948 0.920 
Years of education highest male 8.587 7.325 6.162 5.461 
Years of education highest female 6.025 4.203 3.388 2.686 
Household size 5.303 5.379 5.242 5.261 
Household proportion adult males 0.380 0.356 0.340 0.341 
Household proportion adult females 0.362 0.354 0.345 0.343 
 
Village characteristics 
Distance to nearest bank branch (km) 
 
 
5.705 
 
 
5.942 
 
 
6.543 
 
 
8.500 
Distance to nearest town/city (km) 14.411 15.537 16.493 22.113 
Percentage of households with electricity 62.248 58.413 55.701 45.788 
 
State population proportions 
Himachal Pradesh 
 
 
0.673 
 
 
0.076 
 
 
0.223 
 
 
0.029 
Punjab 0.740 0.167 0.093 0.000 
Uttarakhand 0.230 0.237 0.533 0.000 
Haryana 0.575 0.352 0.071 0.002 
Rajasthan 0.180 0.531 0.168 0.121 
Uttar Pradesh 0.311 0.562 0.127 0.000 
Bihar 0.278 0.622 0.087 0.013 
West Bengal 0.484 0.185 0.296 0.035 
Jharkhand 0.151 0.270 0.096 0.484 
Orissa 0.102 0.523 0.170 0.205 
Chhattisgarh 0.026 0.491 0.077 0.405 
Madhya Pradesh 0.230 0.481 0.091 0.198 
Gujarat 0.325 0.443 0.051 0.182 
Maharashtra 0.375 0.471 0.060 0.094 
Andhra Pradesh 0.319 0.480 0.174 0.027 
Karnataka 0.265 0.587 0.062 0.086 
Kerala 0.677 0.275 0.048 0.000 
Tamil Nadu 0.117 0.712 0.157 0.015 
Notes: 
This table presents means and proportions of all covariates used according to caste group, viz. Brahmin, 
OBC, SC and ST. All statistics are estimates for the population that take into account survey probability 
weights. 
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all statistics shown are population estimates that take survey weights into account, as do 
all our estimations. 
Caste-wise means and proportions follow expected patterns in that land ownership, 
renting and leasing, incomes, and access to credit are all higher for Brahmins and 
OBCs, followed by SCs and then STs.12 It might seem surprising that average incomes 
are lower than average consumption expenditure, even though the former is an annual 
figure and the latter monthly. The survey documentation (Desai and Vanneman, 2015) 
offers two reasons for this: first, several incomes are negative, reflecting the precarious 
nature of cultivator livelihoods. Second, calculating incomes is notoriously difficult 
when several components are measured in kind.13   
 
 3 Empirical framework 
Our analysis seeks to estimate the residual effects of caste belonging on the demand 
for loans, as well as their subsequent approval. We use logit specifications to model 
both the decision to apply for an agricultural loan, and subsequent loan approvals 
for those who applied. For household i, let Y1i and Y2i denote the binary outcomes of 
applying for an agricultural bank loan and, respectively, having this application 
approved and thus receiving a loan.  We model the probability of each outcome using a 
logit specification: 
                                  
Pr[𝑌!! = 1|𝐗] = !𝐗!𝛃!!!𝐗!𝛃                                (1)∀𝑖 s. t. 𝑌!! = 1,Pr[𝑌!! = 1|𝐗] = !𝐗!𝛃!!!𝐗!𝛃                                 (2) 
X is a vector of covariates that includes caste-group dummies and β is a vector of 
coefficients that we seek to estimate. We use the same set of covariates to model loan 
applications and approvals, since a priori there is no theoretical rationale to exclude any 
of them. 
Unbiased estimation of the residual effects of caste-group on loan applications and bank 
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approval decisions requires controlling for characteristics that influence application 
decisions and respectively, signal creditworthiness. To this end we include variables 
known to influence access to credit (see, for example, Pal, 2002; Swain, 2007), including 
household income and land owned – the latter the primary form of collateral demanded 
by banks.14 We also control for land rented in and rented out, monthly consumption 
expenditure, age and sex of the household head, years of education of the highest-
educated male and female in the household, household size, and household proportions 
of males and females. 
Second, we must account for the supply of loans. For loan applications, distance to the 
nearest bank (including if a bank is present in the village) is an important indicator of the 
access to credit. This distance might also function as a proxy of banks’ knowledge about 
potential borrowers, thus influencing approvals. We include this distance as a village- 
level covariate, together with two indicators of development and connectedness, viz. the 
proportion of households with electricity, and the distance to the nearest town/city. Un- 
fortunately the data on these covariates are not ideal, since they are from an earlier round 
of the IHDS survey conducted in 2004-05. However the results are essentially identical 
with or without these village-level covariates, thus suggesting that this data limitation is 
not a serious problem. 
We now focus on loan approvals. Analyses of racial discrimination in access to mort- 
gage or small business loans typically control for past repayment histories and default 
behaviour (e.g. Blanchflower et al., 2003). Since credit ratings and the bureaus that 
maintain such information are not prevalent in the rural Indian context, it is unlikely 
that banks systematically use such information.15 Nonetheless, credit histories or ratings 
could influence loan applications or approvals, and to the extent that they might be 
correlated with caste-group, their exclusion could lead to biased estimates. In 
particular, information on repayment rates or credit histories is important to distinguish 
between statistical discrimination (owing to caste-repayment correlation), and taste-
based discrimination.16 We can infer the latter should residual caste-wise differences 
persist even after controlling for repayment histories. 
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However, the data do not provide information on repayment histories or a suitable proxy. 
Instead, we therefore examine their potential role through a Monte-Carlo simulation 
approach adapted from Ichino et al. (2008). This approach tests the sensitivity of 
our estimation results to the presence of an unobservable. Section 4.1 details the 
method, and the intuition is as follows. Excluding credit histories would lead to biased 
estimates if (unobserved) credit histories are correlated with caste-group as well as a 
bank’s decision to lend.  We can simulate a variable that is correlated with both a 
caste-group of interest and loan approvals and re-estimate our results. Using Monte-
Carlo draws and varying the correlation between the simulated variable and, 
respectively, caste-group and loan approval, we can study the distribution of caste-
group residuals by repeatedly re- estimating the model. The difference between these 
results and the estimates obtained without the simulated variable provide a handle on 
the sensitivity of results, and thus the potential importance of credit histories. It is 
important to note that credit history is only one potential unobservable. The analysis 
can be interpreted more generally, as accounting for the influence of any such 
potential unobservable that is correlated with caste-group and loan approvals. 
Finally, it seems plausible to assume the absence of reverse causation. That is, in the 
short run at least, it is unlikely that loan applications, and more importantly the receipt 
of agricultural loans, would influence any of the right hand side variables. 
 
 
4 Results 
 
The first three rows of table 1 provide (unadjusted) caste-wise proportions in terms of 
access to credit. The first row confirms that there exist substantial inter-caste differ- 
ences in loan access, and in particular, SC and ST borrowers have relatively low access 
to credit. These proportions are the type of statistic provided in official reports such as 
National Sample Survey Organisation (2005), and previous analyses essentially examine 
how these proportions change once borrower characteristics are accounted for, but do not 
differentiate between loan applications and their approval (e.g. Kumar, 2013). In con- 
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trast, this paper aims to investigate the role of caste in both applications and approvals. 
The second row shows that inter-caste differences in loan applications might indeed help 
explain patterns of overall access. Loan application rates follow the stereotypical caste 
hierarchy, with Brahmins the most likely to apply, followed by OBCs, SCs, and finally 
STs; a similar pattern to that of average consumption expenditures and incomes for 
instance. The magnitudes of these differences are substantive, with STs about half as 
likely to apply for a bank loan as Brahmins. 
The third row of table 1 suggests that loan approvals are also not uniform across all caste- 
groups: while 93%-95% of loan applications by Brahmins, OBCs and SCs are approved, 
the proportion for STs substantially lower, at 85%. Our approach aims to analyse the ex- 
tent of residual inter-caste differences that remain in loan application and approval statis- 
tics once we control for household characteristics that proxy ability, credit-worthiness, and 
access. 
Table 2 presents the estimation results from a series of logit models where the dependent 
variable is the decision to apply for a loan. These are presented in terms of odds ratios 
for respective caste dummies.  In all cases the Brahmin caste group is the base 
category. For instance, model 1 shows that in a simple model that includes only 
state dummies, the odds ratio for an SC household applying for a loan relative to 
Brahmins is 0.531. The bottom row reports p-values from Wald tests of joint equality 
of all three caste dummies. Table 3 presents the corresponding estimates for loan 
approvals. For these estimates we use the subsample of those who applied, since loan 
approvals are conditional on application. Here, model 1 which includes only state 
dummies shows that the odds ratio for an SC household having a loan application 
approved relative to Brahmins is 0.823. In both tables, model 1 thus mirrors the 
unadjusted caste-wise proportions in table 1. 
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Table 2: Logit estimation results: loan applications 
 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4 
     
Brahmin (base) (base) (base) (base) 
     
OBC 0.892 1.041 1.076 1.075 
 (0.0807) (0.0949) (0.0985) (0.0986) 
     
SC 0.531*** 0.744** 0.784* 0.783* 
 (0.0622) (0.0924) (0.0991) (0.0992) 
     
ST 0.411*** 0.589*** 0.642*** 0.658*** 
 (0.0554) (0.0846) (0.0941) (0.0989) 
(log) land owned  1.609*** 1.588*** 1.589*** 
  (0.0838) (0.0817) (0.0806) 
     
(log) land rented in  1.115** 1.115** 1.111** 
  (0.0533) (0.0527) (0.0533) 
     
(log) land rented 
out  0.902 0.903 0.901 
  (0.0567) (0.0577) (0.0575) 
     
(log) HH 
consumption 
expenditure 
 1.711*** 1.558*** 1.569*** 
  (0.107) (0.116) (0.118) 
     
HH income  1.000 1.000* 1.000* 
  (0.000193) (0.000189) (0.000188) 
     
age HH head   1.000 1.000 
   (0.00276) (0.00275) 
     
male HH head   1.758*** 1.762*** 
   (0.341) (0.344) 
     
Years of education 
highest male   1.041
*** 1.040*** 
   (0.00936) (0.00931) 
     
Years of education 
highest female   1.007 1.006 
   (0.00857) (0.00855) 
     
HH size   0.986 0.986 
   (0.0176) (0.0176) 
     
HH proportion 
adult males   1.083 1.069 
   (0.264) (0.260) 
     
HH proportion 
adult females   0.786 0.788 
   (0.225) (0.226) 
     
(log) distance    1.145** 
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nearest town 
    (0.0788) 
     
HHs with 
electricity    1.004
** 
    (0.00173) 
     
(log) distance 
closest bank branch    1.031 
    (0.0498) 
Constant 0.464*** 0.000510*** 0.000672*** 0.000279*** 
 (0.0736) (0.000366 (0.000568 (0.000253) 
p-values for caste 
dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents estimates from logit models in terms of odds ratios. The base category is Brahmins. All 
estimates are survey-weighted, and standard errors in parentheses account for village-level clustering as per the survey 
design. The p-values shown are for Wald tests for the null that all three caste dummies are jointly zero. N=8,543. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 3: Logit estimation results: loan approvals 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Brahmin (base) (base) (base) (base) 
     
OBC 1.062 1.116 1.220 1.205 
 (0.272) (0.278) (0.297) (0.299) 
     
SC 0.823 0.948 1.151 1.155 
 (0.289) (0.329) (0.381) (0.384) 
     
ST 0.368*** 0.435** 0.484** 0.523* 
 (0.130) (0.149) (0.167) (0.177) 
(log) land owned  1.422** 1.441** 1.474** 
  (0.228) (0.230) (0.244) 
     
(log) land rented in  1.346** 1.359** 1.368** 
  (0.195) (0.193) (0.196) 
     
(log) land rented out  0.878 0.856 0.840 
  (0.146) (0.153) (0.146) 
     
(log) HH cons. exp.  1.092 1.189 1.158 
  (0.183) (0.200) (0.192) 
     
HH income  1.000 1.000 1.000 
  (0.000449) (0.000448) (0.000403) 
     
age HH head   0.982** 0.981** 
   (0.00767) (0.00773) 
     
male HH head   1.525 1.551 
   (0.533) (0.534) 
     
Years of edu highest 
male 
  0.992 0.990 
   (0.0266) (0.0270) 
     
Years of edu highest   1.045 1.042 
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female 
   (0.0321) (0.0325) 
     
HH size   0.949 0.955 
   (0.0379) (0.0388) 
     
HH propn adult males   8.067** 8.455** 
   (7.004) (7.488) 
     
HH propn adult 
females 
  0.954 0.966 
   (0.884) (0.904) 
     
(log) distance nearest 
town 
   1.038 
    (0.178) 
     
 HHs with electricity    1.005 
    (0.00438) 
     
(log) distance closest 
bank branch 
   0.853 
    (0.106) 
     
Constant 53.56*** 11.19 3.721 3.899 
 (39.60) (21.96) (8.067) (9.438) 
p-values for caste 
dummies 
0.010 0.034 0.053 0.080 
Notes: This table presents estimates from logit models in terms of odds ratios. The base category is Brahmins. All 
estimates are survey-weighted, and standard errors in parentheses account for village-level clustering as per the survey 
design. The p-values shown are for Wald tests for the null that all three caste dummies are jointly zero. N=3,619. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Subsequent models in tables 2 and 3 show how respective odds ratios change as additional 
variables are added to the model. Model 2 adds household-level characteristics including 
land owned, rented out and rented in, and income and consumption expenditure, while 
model 3 adds the age and sex of the household head, the years of education of the most 
educated male and female members, household size, and the proportion of adult 
males and females. Model 4 adds village-level information on distance to the nearest 
bank and to the nearest town/city, and the proportion of households with electricity.  
In general, as we move from simpler to more complex models, inter-caste differences 
in both applications and approvals are reduced as more covariates are controlled for. 
The odds ratios become closer to unity even though, as the p-values suggest, 
substantive inter-caste differences persist. 
To examine how these estimation results relate to unadjusted the caste-wise proportions 
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in table 1, we calculate the predicted probabilities of loan application and approval. In 
table 4 we report the sample-averaged predicted probabilities corresponding to models 
4 of  tables 2 and 3 (those for model 3 are very similar, as the odds ratios would 
suggest). These sample- averaged predicted probabilities have the useful interpretation 
of the treatment effect of caste-group belonging, provided that the estimation model 
has been correctly specified and that there are no omitted variables. For these 
predictions, all variables except caste are held at their sample values, and the caste 
variable is changed to Brahmin (say) to calculate the predicted probabilities for 
Brahmins, and likewise for other caste-groups. The decision to hold all non-caste 
variables at their sample values (rather than means, for instance) ensures that these 
calculations have a genuine interpretation as the actual probabilities that would have 
resulted were all households Brahmin (and so on). The bot- tom half of each row 
provides results from Wald tests for comparisons of these caste-wise predictions, and 
these show that inter-caste differences are also statistically significant. 
 
Table 4: Predicted probabilities by caste group 
Loan applications  Loan approvals 
Brahmin OBC SC ST  Brahmin OBC SC ST 
0.405 0.419 0.357 0.324  0.937 0.947 0.945 0.892 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024)  (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.026) 
All castes equal: p=0.000  All castes equal: p=0.218 
     ST and non-ST equal: p=0.047 
 
Notes: Rows 1-4 (5-8) of this table show sample-average probabilities by caste group predicted by 
model 4 in table 2 ( t a b l e  3 ) .Standard errors are given in parentheses. p-values correspond to 
Wald tests for respective null hypotheses. 
 
 
Columns 1-4 of table 4 show that loan applications vary by caste, in a way that mir- 
rors unadjusted proportions (table 1) but with attenuation. This pattern confirms that 
residual inter-caste differences in loan application rates are an important factor behind 
differences in overall access to credit. Next, columns 5-8 show that Brahmins, OBCs and 
SCs all have similar rates of loan approval, but that the corresponding rate for STs is 
 16 
about 5% lower.17,18 This distinct residual difference despite controlling for a rich set 
of relevant covariates suggests that banks might discriminate against STs. So far we 
have focused on loan applications and approvals, but not loan amounts or interest rates. 
Banks can also discriminate by providing smaller amounts or lending at higher interest rates to 
certain caste-groups. We examine this possibility in appendix B and find that conditional 
on household and village characteristics, overall, there are no significant residual effects 
of caste-group belonging on loan amounts or interest rates. 
Recall that while taste-based discrimination captures residual inter-caste differences after 
controlling for all relevant characteristics, one or more of these characteristics might be 
unobserved. In our case, while we have controlled for important indicators of credit- 
worthiness – in particular in the form of collateral (land) and incomes – the data do not 
have information about credit histories. Similarly, additional borrower characteristics 
might also influence a bank’s decision to lend, such as the quality (and not just area) 
of land owned. If one or more of these unobserved characteristics are correlated with 
caste, then residual inter-caste differences in loan approvals might simply reflect statistical 
discrimination on the part of lenders. Since they do not have explicit information on, 
for instance, repayment abilities, but have found through past experience that certain 
caste-groups have lower repayment rates, then a bank could simply use caste-group as a 
proxy for repayment abilities. 
While the ethical appropriateness of this decision is questionable, it is not hard to see 
why lenders might resort to such decisions when driven by profit motives. In that case, 
the estimated residual differences using our data might in fact be a combination of statis- 
tical and taste-based discrimination. In order to examine whether the observed residual 
differences are solely due to taste, we need to control for potential sources of statistical 
discrimination. 
We propose a procedure to investigate this through a simulation approach. 
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4.1   A simulation approach to unobserved credit histories 
 
Suppose that credit histories influence banks’ decisions to approve agricultural loans, 
and that as a group, STs have inferior credit histories compared to non-STs.  Then, our 
finding that ST group-belonging has a residual, negative effect on loan approvals, might 
get partially or fully explained away by controlling for loan histories in equation 2. That 
is, while our results suggest that banks discriminate against STs, the absence of this 
variable in the data means that we cannot infer whether the discrimination is statistical 
-- if STs have worse credit histories on average -- or taste-based. 
We approach this problem using Monte-Carlo simulation, adapting an approach suggested 
by Ichino et al. (2008) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Both papers investigate how 
including a hitherto binary unobservable might change the estimate of a treatment effect. 
They consider a situation where the assignment to treatment is potentially confounded 
if the unobservable (e.g. creditworthiness) is excluded from the estimation, but becomes 
unconfounded once this unobservable is controlled for. Ichino et al. (2008) implement 
this idea for treatment effects estimation using propensity score matching, and propose a 
simple way of parameterising the distribution of the binary unobservable. Partitioning the 
set of observations into four quadrants according to (binary) treatment status and (also 
binary) outcome, four corresponding probabilities that the unobservable equals one are 
specified. Monte-Carlo draws are used to construct the unobservable such that it 
conforms, on average, to this set of probabilities. Throughout the discussion of this 
simulation approach, we focus only on households who have applied for loans. 
The treatment effect is then re-estimated for each draw having included the 
unobservable as a covariate, and this exercise is repeated across multiple draws and with 
different combinations of the probabilities characterising the unobservable. Using 
Ichino et al. (2008)’s notation, if the number of simulations undertaken is m and the 
estimated treatment effect for the kth simulation is ATˆ T k , then the overall estimate ATˆ 
T  is obtained as !! 𝐴𝑇𝑇!!!!! . If se!! denotes the variance of 𝐴𝑇𝑇! then the variance of 𝐴𝑇𝑇 is calculated as (eq.11, p.321): 
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𝑇 = 1𝑚 se!!!!!! + 𝑚+ 1𝑚(𝑚− 1) (!!!! 𝐴𝑇𝑇! −𝐴𝑇𝑇)! 
We adapt Ichino et al. (2008)’s method for characterising the distribution of the unob- 
servable, even as our set-up is more similar to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) who use a 
logit model to estimate the effect of a binary treatment on a binary outcome. Note that 
‘treatment’ in our case is the categorical variable of caste-group belonging, and outcome 
is the binary loan-approval. Caste-group cannot be manipulated in reality, but 
conceptually we are studying the consequences that would arise as if it could. And, 
caste-wise differences in predicted loan approval probabilities calculated by averaging 
over the full sample (as we did in table 3) are in effect estimates of this treatment effect. 
Since our focus is on potential taste-based discrimination against STs, for this part of 
the analysis the four caste categories can be simplified to just two: ST and non-ST. This 
simplification is also intuitively appealing: our results thus far suggest that differences 
in loan approvals between Brahmins, OBCs and SCs are negligible, and it is the gap 
between these groups and STs that potentially suggest institutional discrimination. 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Constructing the unobservable 
 
We consider only those households who have applied for a bank loan, and our focus is on 
loan approvals. Let H denote hitherto unobserved credit histories, where for household 
k, Hk can either be 1 (good history) or 0 (poor history).19 Let STk = 1 if household k 
belongs to a Scheduled Tribe, and STk = 0 for all other caste-groups. And, let Y  denote 
loan approval outcomes, with Yk = 1 if the loan is approved and Yk = 0 if it is denied. 
In the following, we omit the subscript k for clarity unless otherwise indicated. We can 
partition households into four mutually exclusive groups based on their caste-belonging 
and loan approval outcomes: {Y= i, ST = j}, i, j ∈ {0, 1}. For instance, {Y= 0, ST = 1} 
denotes ST households who have been denied loans. Let Pij be the probability that 
households with loan approval status Y = i and caste group ST = j have a good credit 
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history.20 That is 
 𝑃!" = Pr 𝐻 = 1 𝑌 = 𝑖, 𝑆𝑇 = 𝑗     𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {0,1}   (4) 
 
 
Then the set {P00, P01, P10, P11} fully characterises the distribution of H. An intuitive 
way of interpreting these probabilities in terms of a bank’s decision to approve loans is 
as follows:  let the total sample population be N and θij  denote the proportion of this 
sample in each of the sets {Y = i, ST = j} where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 0,1 : 21 
 𝜃!" = !! 𝐼!"(𝑘)!!!!     (5) 
 where 𝐼!"(. ) is the indicator function:  
𝐼!" 𝑘 = 1   𝑖𝑓 𝑘 ∈ 𝑌 = 𝑖,𝑆𝑇 = 𝑗0                       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
 
 
In the absence of banks practicing taste-based discrimination against STs, the probability 
that a loan is approved conditional on good credit history will be the same for both ST 
and non-ST households.  Denote this b.  Then 
𝑏 = 𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 1 𝐻 = 1,𝑆𝑇 = 1 = 𝑃!!𝜃!!𝑃!!𝜃!! +𝑃!"𝜃!"                                (6) 
and 𝑏 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 1 ∣ 𝐻 = 1,𝑆𝑇 = 0) = !!"!!"!!"!!"!!!!!!!                                  (7) 
 
Now let µST  (µnon) denote the proportion of ST (non-ST) households with good credit 
histories. Then 𝜇!" = !!!!!!!!!"!!"!!!!!!"        (8) 𝜇!"! = !!"!!"!!!!!!!!!"!!!!      (9)  
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Together, equations 6-9 contain four unknowns (viz. P10, P11, P00, P01) while the θij terms 
are all sample estimates. Solving eqns. 6-9 we get: 
𝑃!! = 1− 𝑏 𝜇!"! 𝜃!" + 𝜃!!𝜃!! ;      𝑃!" = 𝑏𝜇!"!(𝜃!" + 𝜃!!)𝜃!"  (10) 
𝑃!" = 1− 𝑏 𝜇!" 𝜃!! + 𝜃!"𝜃!" ;      𝑃!! = 𝑏𝜇!"(𝜃!! + 𝜃!")𝜃!!  
The aim is to investigate whether poorer credit histories amongst STs could be an ex- 
planation for their lower rates of loan approval.  We therefore assume that 𝜇!"! ≥ 𝜇!", 
and simulate unobservable credit histories H for different combinations of {𝑏,𝜇!",𝜇!"!}. 
 
Not all combinations are feasible, since each of 𝜇!",𝜇!"!,𝑏,𝑃!!,𝑃!",𝑃!",𝑃!! must all lie 
between 0 and 1, which can be verified using eq. 10.  
 
4.1.2 Simulation results 
 
 
With caste-group belonging simplified to ST and non-ST, the baseline difference in loan 
approval rates using all available covariates (i.e. model 4 in table 2) is 0.053 (s.e.= 
0.026, p-value=0.042). Figure 1 summarises how this approval gap changes if we control 
for unobserved credit histories across a range of distributional assumptions. The figure 
consists of two parts: subfigure (a) provides the estimated loan approval gaps, while 
subfigure (b) provides the corresponding p-values using standard errors defined in eq. 3. 
In this figure we have held µST , the proportion of STs with good credit histories, at 0.1. 
To put this into perspective, we know that about one in four STs applied for a loan 
(table 1), so µST = 0.1 assumes that just under half this proportion have good credit 
histories.22 With µST = 0.1, we assume that µnon ≥ 0.1 since the aim is to examine 
whether higher loan approval rates for non-STs might in fact arise from better credit 
histories. In appendix C we provide further results holding µST = 0.25 and µST = 0.5, 
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which we find to be qualitatively identical to those with µST  = 0.1. 
At each point in figure 1, the distribution of simulated credit histories H is given by µnon 
along the y-axis and b along the x-axis. Thus, loan approval becomes more dependent 
on credit history as we move along the x-axis, and the proportion of non-STs with good 
credit histories rises as we move along the y-axis. The figure is constructed using Akima 
interpolation based on a grid of 558 points with 200 replications per point.23  
How does our original result change once we account for unobservable credit histories? 
Not very much. The figure shows that ST loan approval rates remain at least 4-6% lower 
than those for non-STs, and this gap can potentially widen, for a range of distributional 
assumptions concerning H. The darker shades in subfigure (a) denote the area where our 
result remains valid, while subfigure (b) shows that the associated p-values are statistically 
significant. Regardless of the proportion of non-STs being multiple times that of STs, 
the approval gap still remains – indeed can increase – even if banks increasingly 
base loan approvals on credit histories; i.e. 0.5 ≤ b ≤ 0.9. 
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Figure 1: Simulation results 
 
Notes: This figures summarise the results from the simulation exercise where we hold µST , viz. the 
proportion of STs with good credit histories, at 0.1. Values for µnon, viz. the proportion of non-STs with 
good credit histories, are along the y-axis, while values for b, viz. the probability that banks will 
approve a loan conditional on good credit history, are along the x-axis. Each point thus corresponds to 
a given distribution of credit histories H according to combinations of 
{b, µST = 0.1, µnon}. For each combination, the simulation is performed 200 times to re-estimate model 4 
in table 2 with caste simplified to ST and non-ST, and with H included as an additional regressor. For 
each regression, we calculate the difference in sample average predicted probabilities of loan approval for 
STs and non-STs. Subfigure (a) shows the average of these differences across simulations, i.e. the 
likelihood by which STs are less likely to have a loan approved compared to non-STs once credit histories 
are controlled for. Subfigure (b) shows the corresponding p-values calculated using equation 3. The 
simulations are based on a grid of 558 values with 200 simulations per point. These values are then 
interpolated using Akima interpolation. The blank areas are due to several combinations of {b, µST  = 0.1, 
µnon} being unfeasible (see eq. 10). 
 
The approval gap reduces and can approach zero if b > 0.9 provided µnon ≥ 0.2. Thus, if 
loan approval is strongly conditional on credit histories (b > 0.9) and if the proportion 
of non-STs with good credit histories is at least double that of STs (0.2 vs 0.1), then 
the evidence towards taste-based discrimination weakens. Notice that the region where 
the result is weakened is relatively smaller, and it is here that loan approval gaps can be 
explained by statistical discrimination. 
Do banks taste-discriminate against ST borrowers? The results from this simulation 
exercise suggest that likely answer is yes, since the residual effects of caste-group 
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Figure 1: Simulation results
Notes: This figures summarise the results from the simulation exercise where we hold µST , viz.
the proportion of STs with good credit histories, at 0.1. Values for µnon, viz. the proportion of
non-STs with good credit histories, are along the y-axis, while values for b, viz. the probability
that banks will approve a loan conditional on good credit history, are along the x-axis. Each
point thus corresponds to a given distribution of credit histories H according to combinations of
{b, µST = 0.1, µnon}. For each combination, the simulation is performed 200 times to re-estimate
model 4 in table 2 with caste simplified to ST and non-ST, and with H included as an additional
regressor. For each regression, we calculate the diﬀerence in sa ple average predicted probabilities
of loan approval for STs and non-STs. Subfigure (a) shows the average of these diﬀerences across
simulations, i.e. the likelihoo by which STs are less likely to have a loan approved com ared to
non-STs once credit histories are controlled for. Subfigure (b) show the corresponding p-values
calculated using equation 3. Th simulations are based on a grid of 558 values with 200 simula ions
per point. These values are then interpolated u ing Akima interpol tion. The blank areas are due
to several combinations of {b, µST = 0.1, µnon} being unfe sible (see eq. 10).
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belonging are robust to the inclusion of hitherto unobserved credit histories for most, 
but not all specifications. Provided bank lending is not strongly predicated on good 
credit histories, the gap between STs and non-STs in most cases remains at least 4-6% 
even after accounting for credit histories. 
To recap, our analysis so far suggests the presence of inter-caste differences in loan appli- 
cation and approval rates. However, these aggregate results can potentially mask diverse 
patterns across states and individuals. Below, we reexamine these results by dividing our 
sample along two specific dimensions. The first of these is land ownership, motivated by 
the RBI’s policy directive to banks to enable access to small farmers, defined as those 
who own 5 acres or less. The second is the relative demographic presence of STs at the 
state level, motivated by possibility of potential gains that their greater numeric strength 
might bring about. 
 
4.2 Small farmers 
 
The Reserve Bank of India has long recognised the challenges faced by small and 
marginal farmers in accessing agricultural loans. Its policy guidance has encouraged 
banks to set aside a proportion of overall lending for the ‘priority sector’, and within  
this  certain ‘weaker sections’, which include small farmers (Reserve Bank of India, 
2007).  Small farmers are defined by land holdings  of 5 acres or less. We now 
estimate our results separately for small farmers and for farmers who own more than 5 
acres  of  land,  to examine whether there is supportive evidence towards this policy’s 
effectiveness.24  
The top half of table 5 presents these results. As in the preceding section, the model 
specification includes all available covariates, and appendix A presents the full regression. 
These results show that inter-caste differences in application rates are stark only for large  
 
 
 24 
farmers. For small farmers there exist minor differences suggestive of the pattern we 
witness in the full sample, but their magnitude is far smaller. Similarly, looking at 
loan approvals, potential discrimination against STs is apparent only for large farmers; 
for small farmers the loan approval rates are essentially indistinguishable across caste 
groups. 
This suggests that RBI guidance for lending to weaker sections may well be proving 
effective, even though our data do not allow us to examine this question directly. 
Table 5: Predicted probabilities for subpopulation estimations 
          
 
Loan applications 
 
Loan approvals 
          
 
Brahmin OBC SC ST 
 
Brahmin OBC SC ST 
Small farmers  0.479 0.479 0.436 0.436   0.965 0.947 0.943 0.931 
(N=2788)  (0.039) (0.033) (0.040) (0.050)   (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.030) 
  All castes equal: p=0.464 
 
All castes equal: p=0.544 
  
     
ST and non-ST equal: p=0.486 
          Large farmers 0.413 0.438 0.374 0.318    0.93 0.956 0.953 0.896 
(N=5755)  (0.021) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028)   (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.028) 
  All castes equal: p=0.000 
 
All castes equal: p=0.099 
      
ST and non-ST equal: p=0.072 
          States with  0.378 0.36 0.27 0.286 
 
0.966 0.924 0.914 0.838 
significant ST (0.036) (0.023) (0.033) (0.027) 
 
-0.017 -0.016 -0.03 -0.042 
population All castes equal: p=0.013 
 
All castes equal: p=0.011 
(N=2619)  
     
ST and non-ST equal: p=0.013 
          Remaining 
states 0.417 0.441 0.384 0.349 
 
0.937 0.953 0.949 0.924 
(N=5924)  (0.018) (0.017) (0.026) (0.040) 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.032) 
 
All castes equal: p=0.038 
 
All castes equal: p=0.626 
  
 
   
   
ST and non-ST equal: p=0.501 
       
Notes: This table shows sample-average predicted probabilities by caste group for respective subpopulations 
from Logit models using all available covariates. Thus these are the same as model 4 in tables 2 and 3. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses, and p-values are for Wald tests for respective null hypotheses. 
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Not only are loan approval rates essentially equal across caste groups for small 
farmers, they are also slightly higher than the corresponding rates for large farmers. 
The same goes for loan application rates, in that small farmers are slightly more likely 
to apply, and significant inter-caste differences exist only for large farmers.25 It would 
appear that banks use less discretion in lending to small farmers, and having 
experienced this willingness to lend over time, small farmers are more likely to apply 
for loans. 
 
4.3 States with significant ST populations 
 
STs are widely regarded as one of the most disadvantaged groups in Indian society, and 
according to the 2011 census they constitute nearly 9% of the total population. Their 
distribution is quite uneven across the states, and as table 1 affirms, STs are a substantive 
proportion in a few states but a very small minority in most others.26 We might expect 
that in states where STs are a relatively larger minority, they would garner greater 
political and economic agency, and thus be less susceptible to discrimination. 
Alternatively, in these states, they might also become a more visible target for 
discrimination if they are competing with other caste groups for limited resources. 
Which of these phenomena dominates can be tested by dividing the sample into two 
groups based on the relative populations of STs. Five states in our sample have an ST 
population proportion of at least 20%: Jharkhand (48%), Chhattisgarh (41%), Madhya 
Pradesh (20%), Orissa (21%) and Gujarat (18%).27 We now examine loan application 
and approval rates by caste in these states and, separately, in the remaining 13 states 
where STs are very small minorities. 
The bottom half of table 5 summarises the results for these two groups of states. The 
specification used is the same as model 4 in table 2, which uses all available covariates. 
Full regression results are presented in appendix A. These probabilities suggest that the 
lower loan approval rates for STs in the full sample arise from states where STs are a 
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substantial proportion of the population. States where STs are a very small part of the 
population do have lower approval rates for ST, but these are only marginally lower than 
those for non-STs, a trend confirmed by the corresponding p-values as well. In other 
words, of the two phenomena outlined above, the possibility of discrimination due to 
being a visible minority seems to dominate any political and economic agency that STs 
can muster.  This result is similar to Das et al’s (2012) finding that poverty reduction 
rates are slower amongst STs who reside in states with significant ST populations. 
Unfortunately we are unable to consider North-Eastern states in our analysis, where STs 
are a significant proportion of the population and the majority in some. This limitation 
is due to the sample size available. There are only 37 farmer households in our data who 
applied for credit in these states, of which 17 received a loan, thus making it impractical 
to use regression analysis to model any caste-wise differences. That said, these states are 
also culturally and economically isolated from other parts of India, have sparser bank 
networks, and are thus likely to be distinct from the 18 states we are focusing on. 
 
 
5   Discussion 
 
Patterns of differential access to bank loans by caste-group bear structural similarities 
to the insights from studies on labour market discrimination by gender and race. Is 
there evidence of discrimination against certain caste-groups? If so, what is the nature of 
this discrimination? We investigate these questions in the Indian context, distinguishing 
between statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination. Our paper finds that 
Scheduled Tribe borrowers are, after controlling for relevant characteristics, less likely to 
have a loan application approved relative to other three caste groups (89% versus 94-95%). 
Through counterfactual simulations, we argue that statistical discrimination stemming 
from banks using caste belonging as a proxy for unobserved characteristics (e.g. credit 
histories) is unlikely. That is, ST borrowers likely face taste-based discrimination. 
Burgess and Pande (2005) show that overall access to bank loans for SCs and STs im- 
proved during 1980s due to banking policy even as it slightly regressed during the 1990s. 
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Despite the absence of legislation against discrimination in access to credit unlike the 
Equal Credit Opportunities Act in the USA for instance, the RBI has long propagated 
lending directives to banks emphasising improved access for SCs and STs.  This paper 
finds that the magnitude of difference in loan approvals is indeed very little across caste 
groups. Overall, this suggests that RBI guidance emphasising inclusion has proved largely 
successful, even as we find that STs face persistent, though marginally (~5%) lower rates 
of loan approval. Our finding that caste-wise differences are significantly muted for small 
farmers – those who own less than 5 acres of land – is again consistent with the RBI’s 
guidance encouraging lending to weaker sections of society. Not only do we find no 
evidence of caste discrimination in lending to small farmers, but crucially, small farmer 
SCs and STs are more likely to apply for loans relative to the full sample. 
Another finding concerns the prevalence of discrimination across states. We find that 
lending in states where STs constitute very small minorities in terms of population is less 
likely to exhibit taste-based discrimination. On the other hand, we find that taste-based 
discrimination in loan approvals exists in states where STs have a significant population, 
though still a minority. This suggests that having a significant demographic presence 
does not necessarily guarantee that discriminatory practices will weaken. 
The process of getting a loan involves applying for one, and having this application 
approved. Typically, studies have focused on overall access and hence fail to 
distinguish between these two steps (e.g. Burgess et al., 2005; Kumar, 2013). Our analysis 
shows that loan application rates account for a major component of inter-caste 
differences in loan access. SCs and STs are less likely to apply for bank loans compared 
to OBCs and Brahmins, and this pattern remains even after controlling for various 
relevant characteristics. Thus, dynamic patterns of overall access need to decomposed 
into application and approval rates to better comprehend the mechanism behind any 
changes due to policy. Our study, though cross-sectional, demonstrates the importance of 
this distinction by showing that application rates differ substantially across caste-groups. 
Why do loan application rates differ by caste? Studies on labour market discrimination 
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potentially offer insight into the role of expectations and demand. In these studies, part 
of the difference in pay (say) by gender or race can stem from a failure to demand higher 
pay. In other words, driven by expectations potentially based on experience, individuals 
belonging to certain groups can resign themselves and forego better outcomes. This occurs 
regardless of any form of discrimination. In the same vein, it is possible that STs and SCs 
might hesitate to apply for bank loans because they have learned, as a community if not 
as individuals, that they are less likely to receive them.28 A corroborating observation is 
that education and income levels, arguably linked to expectations as well, are on average 
lower for SCs and STs than for Brahmins and OBCs. In this light, the efficacy of all 
policies aimed at creating a level playing field including better financial access, might be 
consequently constrained in the presence of pessimistic expectations.29 Unfortunately 
this explanation cannot be tested with the data at hand, because expectations themselves 
are unobserved. 
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Appendix A   Logit regression results 
 
 
Tables A1 and A2 show subpopulation-wise Logit regression results for loan applications 
and approvals, respectively. These subpopulations are defined according to land 
ownership and ST population proportions. These are the full regression results for 
sections 4.2 and 4.3. Al l  models contain state fixed effects and robust standard errors 
that account for village-level clustering. 
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Table A1: Subpopulation logit regression: loan applications 
 
 Small farmers Large farmers Tribal states Remaining states 
Brahmin   (base)  
OBC -0.000356 0.125 -0.0938 0.117 
 (0.180) (0.104) (0.175) (0.104) 
SC -0.238 -0.198 -0.602∗∗ -0.165 
 (0.206) (0.162) (0.245) (0.143) 
ST -0.238 -0.496∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗ -0.349 
 (0.267) (0.178) (0.233) (0.223) 
(log) land owned 0.963∗∗∗ 
(0.177) 
0.360∗∗∗ 
(0.0754) 
0.572∗∗∗ 
(0.0839) 
0.436∗∗∗ 
(0.0612) 
(log) land rented in 0.163∗ 0.128∗∗ -0.103 0.168∗∗∗ 
 (0.0894) (0.0576) (0.0760) (0.0590) 
(log) land rented out -0.208 -0.0990 -0.0853 -0.113 
 (0.373) (0.0658) (0.102) (0.0781) 
(log) HH cons. exp. 0.334∗∗∗ 
(0.128) 
0.490∗∗∗ 
(0.0925) 
0.663∗∗∗ 
(0.126) 
0.382∗∗∗ 
(0.0886) 
HH income 0.000000176 -0.000000418∗∗ -0.00000104∗∗∗ -0.000000165 
 (0.000000333) (0.000000196) (0.000000390) (0.000000180) 
age HH head 0.00568 -0.00345 -0.00140 0.000110 
 (0.00547) (0.00309) (0.00483) (0.00330) 
male HH head 0.275 0.665∗∗∗ 0.474∗ 0.594∗∗ 
 (0.331) (0.239) (0.286) (0.232) 
Years of edu highest male 0.0327∗∗ 
(0.0158) 
0.0422∗∗∗ 
(0.0112) 
0.0569∗∗∗ 
(0.0137) 
0.0365∗∗∗ 
(0.0106) 
Years of edu highest female 0.00987 0.00410 -0.0340∗∗ 0.0174∗ 
 (0.0155) (0.0108) (0.0168) (0.00961) 
HH size -0.00201 -0.0174 -0.0292 -0.0118 
 (0.0360) (0.0206) (0.0295) (0.0209) 
HH propn adult males 0.409 -0.126 -0.473 0.236 
 (0.474) (0.285) (0.419) (0.294) 
HH propn adult females -0.533 -0.0808 0.594 -0.552 
 (0.517) (0.347) (0.525) (0.341) 
(log) distance nearest town 0.0130 0.184∗∗ -0.0631 0.215∗∗ 
 (0.107) (0.0793) (0.104) (0.0850) 
% HHs with electricity 0.00186 0.00474∗∗ 0.00737∗∗ 0.00178 
 (0.00264) (0.00210) (0.00292) (0.00209) 
(log) distance closest bank branch -0.0317 0.0635 0.0186 0.0328 
 (0.0760) (0.0547) (0.0871) (0.0567) 
Constant -6.922∗∗∗ 
(1.528) 
-8.454∗∗∗ 
(1.154) 
-10.77∗∗∗ 
(1.399) 
-7.504∗∗∗ 
(1.077) 
Observations 2788 5755 2619 5924 
Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
All models contain state dummies 
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Table A2: Subpopulation logit regression: loan approvals 
 
 Small farmers Large farmers Tribal states Remaining states 
Brahmin   (base)  
OBC -0.535 0.526∗ -1.004 0.321 
 (0.465) (0.296) (0.655) (0.273) 
SC -0.640 0.453 -1.161 0.220 
 (0.577) (0.394) (0.759) (0.356) 
ST -0.874 -0.471 -2.072∗∗∗ -0.216 
 (0.680) (0.388) (0.635) (0.528) 
(log) land owned 0.834∗∗ 0.235 0.872∗∗ 0.297∗ 
 (0.354) (0.242) (0.434) (0.179) 
(log) land rented in 0.611∗∗∗ 0.321∗ 0.444 0.324∗ 
 (0.236) (0.189) (0.351) (0.166) 
(log) land rented out 0.0957 -0.127 -0.169 -0.203 
 (0.658) (0.190) (0.241) (0.209) 
(log) HH cons. exp. 0.0467 0.287 -0.332 0.150 
 (0.355) (0.194) (0.331) (0.194) 
HH income 0.00000463∗ -0.000000375 -0.00000186∗∗ 0.000000283 
 (0.00000243) (0.000000617) (0.000000899) (0.000000808) 
age HH head -0.0172 -0.0184∗∗ -0.0383∗∗ -0.0146 
 (0.0138) (0.00916) (0.0167) (0.00898) 
male HH head 1.220∗∗ 0.0747 -0.0642 0.562 
 (0.488) (0.465) (0.773) (0.367) 
Years of edu highest male -0.0277 0.00948 -0.0464 -0.000203 
 (0.0388) (0.0359) (0.0534) (0.0310) 
Years of edu highest female 0.138∗∗∗ -0.00825 0.0641 0.0369 
 (0.0483) (0.0377) (0.0543) (0.0371) 
HH size -0.215∗∗∗ 0.0168 0.192∗∗ -0.0908∗∗ 
 (0.0796) (0.0548) (0.0753) (0.0447) 
HH propn adult males 2.996∗∗ 1.373 2.388∗ 2.162∗ 
 (1.346) (1.175) (1.229) (1.149) 
HH propn adult females 0.202 0.268 1.867 -0.555 
 (1.592) (1.145) (1.600) (1.129) 
(log) distance nearest town -0.340 0.291 -0.197 0.154 
 (0.271) (0.216) (0.324) (0.199) 
% HHs with electricity -0.00954 0.0102∗∗ 0.00795 0.00257 
 (0.00765) (0.00501) (0.00754) (0.00499) 
(log) distance closest bank branch -0.138 -0.183 -0.237 -0.129 
 (0.185) (0.165) (0.198) (0.149) 
Constant 3.474 13.63 3.664 1.158 
 (4.676) (.) (4.342) (2.766) 
Observations 744 2845 1014 2605 
Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
All models contain state dummies 
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Appendix B Loan amounts and interest rates 
 
Our main analysis focuses on the binary event of obtaining a loan. In this appendix, 
we examine whether loan amounts or interest rates differ systematically by caste. There 
is inherent sample selection in the data for loan amounts and interest rates because the 
survey questionnaire asks about these attributes only for the largest loan borrowed by 
the household in the five years preceding the survey. 70% (survey weighted) of the farmer 
households in our sample who received a bank loan declare this to be their largest loan 
and thus provide information on amounts and interest rates. 62% of these (i.e. 43% of 
the total) declare that this loan was for agriculture or agricultural equipment purchase. 
 
The top panel of table B1 summarises average and regression-adjusted annualised 
interest rates according to caste-group. The regression-adjusted values are calculated 
as linear predictions from a model that includes all the covariates used in model 4 in 
table 2, that is, caste, land and income, education and household composition, village 
characteristics, and state dummies. Interest rates on agricultural bank loans do differ by 
caste group, with the lower caste-groups, viz. SCs and STs, reporting lower interest rates 
than Brahmins or OBCs. This pattern persists even after borrower characteristics are 
accounted for, though the inter-caste differences become smaller. This should not be 
surprising, because the RBI encourages agricultural lending to SCs and STs at lower 
rates of interest under the ‘Differential Rate of Interest Scheme’ (Reserve Bank of India, 
2011). For bank loans not restricted to agricultural purposes, the same pattern is visible 
but inter-caste differences are no longer statistically significant. 
 
Loan amounts are summarised in the bottom panel of table B1. In contrast to 
interest rates, these reflect the conventional caste-group hierarchy, with Brahmins 
receiving larger loans, followed by OBCs, SCs and STs in decreasing order. This order 
is visible for all bank loans. Regression-adjustment in this table is performed using 
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Poisson regression models, where the dependent variable is loan amounts and the 
covariates used are as in model 4 in table 2.30 The regression-adjusted results show that 
inter-caste differences are no longer statistically significant once socio-economic 
characteristics are controlled for. 
Overall, these results suggest that conditional on household and village characteristics, 
loan amounts and interest rates do not differ significantly by caste-group with the 
possible exception of interest rates on agricultural loans. 
  
 38 
 
Table B1: Interest rates and loan amounts by caste-group 
          
 
Unadjusted means 
 
Regression adjusted 
        
 
Brahmin OBC SC ST 
 
Brahmin OBC SC ST 
Interest rates (annual %)         
All loans 8.35 6.16 6.228 5.729 
 
9.162 6.686 5.797 5.2 
 
(28.072) (4.873) (4.514) (5.164) 
 
(2.281) (0.664) (0.62) (1.05) 
  All castes equal: p=0.270 
 
All castes equal: p=0.482 
  
 
   
    
          Agricultural 7.082 5.999 6.209 5.434 
 
6.921 6.003 6.1 5.702 
loans (4.459) (4.692) (4.282) (4.983) 
 
(0.297) (0.266) (0.501) (0.594) 
  All castes equal: p=0.028 
 
All castes equal: p=0.052 
          Loan amounts (Rs. '000) 
       All loans 140.906 129.985 73.342 61.891 
 
102.173 113.576 97.204 83.678 
 
(265.917) (347.325) (120.262) (109.888) 
 
(8.831) (16.249) (15.868) (18.228) 
 
All castes equal: p=0.000 
 
All castes equal: p=0.538 
  
 
   
    
          Agricultural  128.837 108.926 47.138 56.661 
 
76.243 76.286 59.769 79.261 
Loans (303.032) (195.627) (69.693) (104.808) 
 
(6.189) (6.659) (8.54) (17.37) 
 
All castes equal: p=0.000 
 
All castes equal: p=0.355 
  
 
   
    Notes: This table shows caste-wise average interest rates and loan amounts for households. Columns 1-4 
provide unadjusted means with standard deviations in parentheses, while columns 5-8 provide regression 
adjusted predictions with standard errors in parentheses. The p-values are for Wald tests for respective 
hypotheses. The regression model for interest rates is OLS using all available covariates, as in model 4 in tables 
2 and 3. For loan amounts, we use a poisson regression model using the same covariates. N=2548 for bank 
loans for any purpose, and N=1516 for agricultural loans. 
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Appendix C Additional simulation results 
 
 
Figure 2: Simulation results for µST = 0.25 and µST = 0.5 
 
Notes: This figures summarise the results from the simulation exercise. µST = 0.25 for subfigures 
(a) and (b), while µST   = 0.5 for subfigures (c) and (d) where µST   denotes the proportion of 
STs with good credit histories. Values for µnon, viz. the proportion of non-STs with good credit 
histories, are along the y-axis, while values for b, viz.  the probability that banks will approve 
a loan conditional on having a good credit history, are along the x-axis. Each point in both 
figures thus corresponds to a given distribution of credit histories H according to combinations of 
{b, µST = 0.25, µnon}. For each combination, the simulation is performed 200 times to re-estimate 
model 4 in table 2 with caste simplified to ST and non-ST, and with H included as an additional 
regressor. For each regression, we calculate the difference in sample average predicted probabilities of 
loan approval for STs and non-STs. The left-hand side subfigures (a) and (c) show the average of 
these differences across simulations, i.e. the likelihood by which STs are less likely to have a loan 
approved than are non-STs once credit histories are controlled for. Subfigures (b) and (d) show the 
corresponding p-values calculated using equation 3. The simulations for µST = 0.25 are based on 
Akima interpolation using a grid of 694 values, while those for µST = 0.5 use a grid of 334 values, 
with 200 simulations for each point. The blank areas are due to several combinations of {b, µST , µnon} 
being unfeasible since all four probabilities that characterise the distribution of H must lie between 0 
and 1 using eq. 10.
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Figure 2: Simulation results for µST = 0.25 and µST = 0.5
Notes: This figures summarise the results from the simulation exercise. µST = 0.25 for subfigures
(a) and (b), while µST = 0.5 for subfigures (c) and (d) where µST denotes the proportion of
STs with good credit histories. Values for µnon, viz. the proportion of non-STs with good credit
histories, are along the y-axis, while values for b, viz. the probability that banks will approve
a loan conditional on having a good credit history, are along the x-axis. Each point in both
figures thus corresponds to a given distribution of credit histories H according to combinations of
{b, µST = 0.25, non}. For each combination, the simulation is performed 200 times to re-estimate
model 4 in table 2 with caste simplified to ST and non-ST, and with H i cluded as an additional
egressor. F r each regres ion, we calc late the diﬀerence in sample average predicted probabilities
of loan approval for STs and non-STs. The left-hand side subfigures (a) and (c) show the average
of e e diﬀ rences across simulations, i.e. the likeli ood by which STs are less likely t have a
loan approved than a e non-STs once credi histories are controlled for. Subfigur (b) and (d)
show the corresponding p-values calculated using equation 3. The simulations for µST = 0.25 are
based on Akima int rp lation using grid of 694 values, while thos for µST = 0.5 use a grid of
334 values, with 200 simulation for each point. The blank areas are due to several combinations
of {b, µST , µnon} being unfeasible since all four pr ba ilities t at characterise th distribution of
H must lie b tween 0 and 1 using eq. 10.
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Endnotes 
                                                
1 Equality in access to economic resources has been traditionally viewed as a vehicle to promote 
broader social equality. For example, this is the rationale behind passing the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act in 1974 (and the subsequent amendment in 1976) in the United States. 
2 Akerlof (1976) provides one of the early theoretical explanations regarding the persistence of caste-
based discrimination given informational costs in an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium framework. 
3 There are substantial, enduring complexities and political agitation around the categorisation of castes 
as OBC (Ramaiah, 1992). 
4 STs are not technically part of the caste system.  Yet tribals are one of the most disadvantaged 
peoples in India, and most analyses of caste therefore include the ST category, as does the current paper. 
5 It is generally agreed that the caste system applies not only to Hindus but to followers of other religions 
in the Indian subcontinent as well. 
6 It is important to distinguish the idea that this demand may vary according to group-belonging and the 
notion that demand is ‘exogenous’ with respect to discrimination. The latter may not be true if 
individuals alter their demand as a result of the past discrimination faced by members of their group. We 
thank an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
7 See LaLonde (1986); Duflo et al. (2007) 
8 Although we refer to credit histories, the approach is more general, and can be interpreted in terms 
of any other key unobservable which might be considered relevant e.g. the quality of land, effort, 
or productivity. 
9 Though there is no equivalent legislation to the United States’ Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
in India, the RBI has long encouraged banks to lend to ‘priority-sectors’, including SCs, STs 
and small farmers. For instance, a recent circular on priority lending targets and classification 
specifies a target of ‘18 percent of Adjusted Net Bank Credit (ANBC) or Credit Equivalent 
Amount of Off- Balance Sheet Exposure, whichever is higher’ towards agricultural sector. The 
corresponding tar- get for ‘weaker sections’, of which SC, ST, small and marginal farmers are a 
part, is ‘10 percent of ANBC or Credit Equivalent Amount of Off-Balance Sheet Exposure, 
whichever is higher’. See https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=9688Mode=0 
10 The National Sample Survey Organisation’s All India Debt and Investment Survey is the other main 
source of information on household’s access to credit. This is a decennial survey, conducted most 
recently in 2013. In keeping with previous rounds, it asks about the details of existing loans but 
does not ask about loan applications. 
11 In particular, the northeastern states account for only 37 farmer households who applied for a loan. Since 
this sample is too small to implement regression analyses, we are unfortunately forced to drop these states 
from our estimations even as a large proportion of tribal groups in India reside in these states. 
12 We combine the caste categories ‘Brahmin’, ‘Others’ and ‘Forward/General’ into one category, which 
we refer to as Brahmin hereon. Thus, this category includes all those who do not belong to the OBC, SC, 
and ST categories. 
13 This pattern is also borne out by data from the National Sample Survey Organisation. See table 2 in 
Mishra (2008). 
14 According to the Reserve Bank of India’s guidelines, banks should not demand collateral for 
loans of up to Rs 50,000, and for larger loans land is the main form of collateral (Reserve Bank of 
India, 2007). 
15 In the case of lending to small businesses, banks are also known to gather ‘soft’ information on 
creditworthiness in the absence of credit ratings (Berger and Udell, 2002). 
16 Kumar (2013) uses data from the National Sample Survey Organisation which lists past repayments, 
and finds that these rates are not correlated with caste-group, but this analysis excludes STs. 
17 The predicted approval rates STs in table 43 are lower than the average of approval rates for Brahmins, 
OBCs and SCs by 0.051 (S.E.= 0.026, p-value=0.047). 
18 We obtain qualitatively identical results for loan approvals using linear probability models that incorporate 
district fixed effects, but with less statistical power. The results are available upon request.  
19 The choice of a binary confounder is a simplification over a more generalised, continuous confounder. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ichino et al. (2008) show, through Monte-Carlo simulation, that this choice is conservative: if results 
are in fact vulnerable to the inclusion of a confounder, then a simulation exercise using a binary 
instead of continuous confounder is less likely to lead to the (mistaken) conclusion that results are 
robust. 
20 These definitions are along the lines of Ichino et al. (2008). 
21 The θij terms are all sample statistics. For STs, we have θ11 = 0.849 and θ01 = 0.151, while for non-
STs we have θ10 = 0.945 and θ00 = 0.055. 
22 Of course everyone with a good credit history need not apply for a loan. 
23 The blank spaces arise from unfeasible combinations of of {µnon, µST , b} following eq. 10. 24 To be clear, we are not claiming to empirically test whether this policy guidance has worked. Since 
our data are cross-sectional, we cannot examine changes over time, and thus relate changes in policy 
to changes in access. Instead, our focus is on the presence of caste-wise differences at a given point in 
time, within a wider policy context that has long emphasised access to credit for disadvantaged 
groups. 
25 A possible explanation may be that small farmers are more likely to apply for loans due to the presence of 
relatively poorer social or credit networks from which they can borrow informally, unlike larger farmers. We 
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
26 See Kijima (2006) for a detailed background and discussion of the socio-economic status of STs. 
27 In our data, population proportions as a whole and not just for farmers, are: Jharkhand (36%), Chhattisgarh 
(29%), Madhya Pradesh (16%), Orissa (17%) and Gujarat (13%). These are still the five states with the 
highest proportion of STs. 
28 They might instead resort to informal sector borrowing, but these loans typically have higher interest 
rates and are on adverse terms compared to bank loans. In this paper our focus is on 
understanding access to formal bank loans. 
29 Dréze et al. (1997) have argued that the distinction between lender discrimination and differences in 
application rates is largely irrelevant, because any hesitation to apply for a loan in fact reflects 
differences in expectations that are based on experiences that might span several years or more. 
30 See section 19.2 of Wooldridge (2010) for a discussion on the rationale behind using Poisson regression 
when the dependent variable has a highly skewed distribution, as our data for loan amounts does. 
